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ABSTRACT 
This article is a response to ‘Fear of death and the symmetry argument’, in this issue. In that 
article, the author discusses the above Lucretian symmetry argument, and proposes a view that 
justifies the existing asymmetry in our attitudes towards birth and death. I begin by 
distinguishing this symmetry argument from a different one, also loosely inspired by Lucretius, 
which also plays a role in the article. I then describe what I take to be the author’s solution to 
the original symmetry argument (i.e. the one above) and explain why I am unpersuaded by it.  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The philosophy of time and the philosophy of death are connected in a 
number of interesting ways.  One cluster of such connections has to do with 
some suggestive remarks of Lucretius’. Lucretius attempts to assuage our fear 
of death by drawing our attention to the likeness between the time before our 
births and the time after our deaths:  
 
‘Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that elapsed 
before our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in which nature 
shows us the time to come after our death.’ (Lucretius, bk III, vv. 972-75) 
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We can find in these remarks an argument about the reasonableness of 
certain attitudes (cf Johansson 2005) that goes as follows. Since past 
nonexistence and future nonexistence are in all relevant respects alike, our 
attitudes towards them should be the same; our attitude towards the former 
(and towards birth) isn’t fearful; hence, our attitude towards the latter (and 
towards death) should also not be fearful. 
This article is a response to ‘Fear of death and the symmetry argument’, in 
this issue. In that article, the author discusses the above Lucretian symmetry 
argument, and proposes a view that justifies the existing asymmetry in our 
attitudes towards birth and death. I begin by distinguishing this symmetry 
argument from a different one, also loosely inspired by Lucretius, which also 
plays a role in the article. I then describe what I take to be the author’s solution 
to the original symmetry argument (i.e. the one above) and explain why I am 
unpersuaded by it. 
 
 
2. Badness versus fear 
 
The Lucretian style of argument has a lot going for it. Suppose two 
students of yours are alike in all relevant respects. If your attitude towards 
them nonetheless differs markedly, clearly something has gone wrong. Or 
suppose there are two airplane seats you have to choose between, and the two 
are in all relevant respects alike. If you feel (dis)inclined towards booking one, 
you should feel (dis)inclined towards booking the other. Your attitudes 
towards them should match. 
Of course, the question now arises whether birth and death are in fact 
alike ‘in all relevant respects’. This is the central issue that ‘Fear of death and 
the symmetry argument’ addresses, and I’ll return to it shortly. But first it’s 
useful to distinguish this symmetry argument from another symmetry 
argument.  
That second symmetry argument is not about the reasonableness of 
attitudes at all; rather, it’s about which events are (extrinsically) bad for one 
and why. It’s directed against a particular account of the badness of death 
called deprivationism. According to deprivationism, death is bad for the one 
who dies iff, and to the extent that, it deprives that person of intrinsic goods 
he or she would have enjoyed had they not died.  The argument goes as 
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follows: If deprivationism is right, then birth too is bad for one, since by its 
lateness it deprives one of intrinsic goods one would have enjoyed had one 
been born earlier. But it isn’t, so deprivationism is mistaken. 
Although the two symmetry arguments are structurally similar, it’s 
important to distinguish them. The first argument is about the reasonableness 
of fearful, or more generally negative emotional attitudes, while the second is 
about the (extrinsic) badness of death. Deprivationists usually insist on a 
substantial divide between what’s bad for one and what it’s all-things-
considered reasonable to feel distressed about. Not finding Aladdin’s lamp is 
strictly speaking (extrinsically) bad for you, on deprivationism, but it needn’t 
be something it would be all-things considered reasonable for you to feel 
badly about. 
One might think the difference is not that important, especially if one 
disagrees with deprivationists on this last point and holds instead that ‘fear of 
bad things is rational’ (p. 2).1 However, keeping the arguments distinct also 
reveals just what needs to be done in order to counter the original symmetry 
argument (about the fear of death). Rather than having to first establish the 
badness of death, and then ‘indicate a relevant asymmetry between the earlier 
and the later temporal limits of our life’, one does not need to do the former. 
Rather, one needs only to do the latter, where the asymmetry one points to 
should be relevant to the reasonableness (or otherwise) of fearful attitudes.   
In other words, providing a response to the original symmetry argument 
is a separate task from that of providing a response to the second symmetry 
argument directed against deprivationism. As an example of how this 
distinction becomes relevant, consider the author’s remarks about the 
Nagelian response to the second symmetry argument. The idea here is that 
we couldn’t have been born substantially earlier than we were, although we 
could die substantially later than we actually die. One’s time of birth, but not 
one’s time of death, is essential to one.  
There are various problems with this deprivationist response (see e.g. 
Johansson 2005). However, the author maintains that the real problem with 
                                                 
1 Though in the context of a defense of deprivationism, which the author takes the 
article to be, this raises the further question of what to say about cases like Aladdin’s 
lamp. Deprivationism seems to entail not finding it is (extrinsically) bad for one, but 
surely it’s not rational to fear or otherwise feel badly about not finding it?  
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it is that ‘even if it is correct, [the response] is too intricate and controversial 
to account for the common sense intuitive asymmetry between birth and 
death’ (p. 6). Their reason for saying this is that they think any justification of 
attitudes has to be first and foremost an explanation of attitudes, and an 
explanation of attitudes has to be ‘at least as obvious and widely accepted as 
the attitudes it seeks to explain’ (p. 6). 
Let’s take these points in reverse order, starting with the final one, which 
resurfaces throughout the paper. Suppose one wants to explain why we don’t 
fear prenatal nonexistence, and/or why there is this asymmetry in our 
attitudes i.e. we don’t fear prenatal but do fear postmortem nonexistence. Is 
it the case that in order for one’s explanation to be a good one, the explanation 
has to be obvious and widely accepted? It seems not: we need not be aware 
of the roots of our attitudes, nor of the roots of asymmetries in our attitudes, 
whether rational or not. For example, suppose part of the explanation of the 
asymmetry in our attitudes appeals to the wider asymmetry in our attitudes 
towards the past and the future. That wider asymmetry is ubiquitous, and an 
important aspect of our mental and emotional lives. But in order to have it, 
one need not be able to recognize that it obtains, much less understand its 
explanation. Most people fear their future dentist visits but not past ones; yet 
most people don’t spend time worrying about the evolutionary or other 
origins of this asymmetry. Such an explanation may be correct, but it’s not ‘at 
least as obvious and widely accepted as the attitudes it seeks to explain’.  
One might add to this that it’s not clear that Nagel’s line of thought is so 
very intricate and far removed from everyday thinking. Granted, everyday 
thinking may not involve explicit modal claims about birth and death, but 
something like the idea that we couldn’t have been born earlier (but could die 
later) may, for all I know, be part of at least some people’s default position.  
Next, take the claim that a justification of attitudes, or asymmetries in 
attitudes, has to first and foremost be an explanation. In practice, a 
justification of attitudes may indeed need to take into account the explanation 
of how those attitudes come about. But prima face, these are again different 
tasks. Certainly one can explain without justifying.  
Finally, again, the task of specifying why death but not birth can be bad 
for one is separate from that of justifying an asymmetry in our attitudes 
towards these two temporal limits of life. That’s of course not to say that 
certain facts can’t be equally well brought to bear on both tasks, and thereby 
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on both symmetry arguments. But keeping the distinction firmly in mind 
prevents us from throwing out approaches to one just because similar 
approaches to the other have not worked. Suppose the previous points 
persuade one that Nagel’s claims don’t lend themselves to either a convincing 
explanation or a justification of the asymmetry in our attitudes. Why should 
that mean they can’t figure in a deprivationist response to the second 
symmetry argument? If they secured that deprivationism did not imply that 
(late) birth is bad for one, they would figure in such a response.  
This is one instance where the distinction between the arguments matters. 
 
 
3. The temporal limits of life 
 
Since the author’s main concern is to justify the asymmetry in our attitudes 
towards birth and death, respectively, it’s appropriate to take the article to be 
mainly a response to the first symmetry argument. From now on, I will focus 
on that aspect of the discussion. 
The author suggests that the answer to the (original) symmetry argument 
‘should be found in a well-known contingent fact about the development of 
living creatures in general and human beings in particular’ (p. 16). This is the 
fact that ‘having a beginning is a nomologically necessary condition for life’, 
i.e. that living beings must begin to exist. ‘[L]ife as we know it cannot exist 
without having a beginning’ (p. 17). The reason this is supposed to help with 
the symmetry argument is that the same is not true of death. While de facto, 
living beings both begin and cease to exist, one of these temporal limits of life 
is necessary and the other contingent, according to the author:  
‘All human beings are mortal, and their lives come to an end at one point 
or another. However, in contrast to birth, this contingent fact seems 
nomologically unnecessary and therefore avoidable. To begin with, although 
the biological process which marks the beginning of life is similar in all human 
beings, the processes which put an end to human lives are different from 
person to person. Some die due to grave bodily harm, others die from 
various diseases, and there are those who die from general deterioration 
caused by old age. […] Indeed, it is easy to imagine a possible continuation of 
any human life, simply by imagining the absence of any disease or bodily harm 
which might bring this life to an end, or by imagining that the process of 
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deterioration which is associated with old age is slowed down or even 
completely stopped.’ (p. 17/8)2 
In short, the author’s response to the (original) symmetry argument is that 
birth, but not death, is nomologically necessary, and hence unavoidable; this 
is the relevant asymmetry between the two temporal limits of life, and it is 
why it is reasonable to have asymmetric attitudes towards them. In particular, 
it’s reasonable to only fear one of them, namely the avoidable one, death. 
‘While birth is viewed as a nomologically necessary condition for life, and 
therefore is seen as a blessing, death is viewed as a nomologically unnecessary, 
and therefore possibly avoidable, limit to life. This asymmetry not only 
explains the fear of death, and the joy of birth, but also justifies these basic 
human attitudes.’ (p. 20) 
The first problem I see with this is that the author gives us no good reason 
to think that the asymmetry in question obtains. That is, we are given no good 
reason to think that life as a matter of biological necessity has to have a 
beginning, but doesn’t have to have an end. The author says that people die in 
different ways, while they are all born, and grow up the same way. Granted 
that there is more variation in the former, since people die of very different 
causes. But this is irrelevant to whether or not they must, in some way, all die. 
Neither birth nor death is metaphysically necessary, so they are contingent in 
that sense; but if birth is biologically necessary, why not death? It seems just 
as much an inescapable part of biological reality. 
Moreover, even if one assumed for the sake of discussion that 
imaginability was a good general guide to biological possibility, the asymmetry 
in question again does not seem to result. We can imagine away any particular 
cause of death, and we can even imagine immortality. But we can also imagine 
having always existed (whether or not we are inclined to imagine this), as the 
author himself invites us to do at some point in the discussion: [T]he relevant 
idea for the current discussion is the idea of an infinite past of individuals, 
                                                 
2 In places, the author describes the fact instead as concerning what we think is the case 
regarding the modal status of birth and death: ‘While the earlier limit of our life is 
viewed as [my emphasis] a nomologically necessary condition for life, the later limit of 
life is not a nomologically necessary condition for life, and is therefore an unnecessary 
limitation of life’ (p. 18). These claims are best kept apart (and I will focus on the 
previous version). 
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and indeed there are traditions which believe in reincarnation, and in some 
versions of the doctrine, there are infinitely many past incarnations’ (p. 16). 
The second problem with this solution is that it’s not clear that the 
asymmetry, if it obtained, would be of the right kind. The key idea of the 
(original) symmetry argument is that past and future nonexistence are equally 
fear-worthy (namely not very), because they are alike in all relevant respects 
(e.g. neither can affect us negatively, cause us pain, etc.). Now suppose the 
main relevant respect in which they differ is that past nonexistence has to 
happen, while future nonexistence just happens. It’s not clear what bearing 
this, by itself, has on how comparatively fear-worthy they are. If there is a 
connection, why not think that what has to happen, and is ‘unavoidable’, is 
rather more fear-worthy than what just happens and is ‘avoidable’? Suppose 
two tigers run towards you, and only one looks avoidable; shouldn’t the other 
one scare you more? 
Perhaps the author would object that while two tigers are equally fear-
worthy to begin with, birth and death are not. But that is just what we need a 
reason to think, in order to answer the (original) symmetry argument.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The Lucretian tries to assuage our fear of death by pointing to the 
similarity between prenatal and postmortem nonexistence. Relevantly similar 
things deserve an equal emotional response. Birth and death are similar in all 
relevant respects, so our attitudes towards them should match. For all we’ve 
said here, this may be right. However, as Johansson (2005) emphasizes, the 
symmetry argument only gets us to the conclusion that our attitudes towards 
birth and death should match, not that they shouldn’t be fearful. The next 
question would then be why we shouldn’t fear prenatal nonexistence too.3  
 
 
                                                 
3  Acknowledgement: This response was written while I was a member of the 
Templeton World Charity Foundation project ‘Theology, Philosophy of Religion, and 
the Natural Sciences’. 
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